Greg Detre
Saturday, 27 January, 2001
as recommended by Leila + her dad
Reading � Julian Jaynes, �The origin of consciousness in
the breakdown of the bicameral mind�
Part I,
chapter 1 � �Consciousness on consciousness��
Part I,
chapter 2 � �Consciousness�
Part I,
chapter 3 � �Mind in the Iliad�
Part I,
chapter 4 � �The bicameral mind�
Part I,
chapter 5 � �The double brain�
Part I,
chapter 6, �The origins of civilisation�
A brilliant discussion of the 8 traditional theories of consciousness:
as a property of matter
as a property of protoplasm
as learning
as a metaphysical imposition
the helpless spectator theory
emergent evolution
behaviourism
as the reticular activating
system
Consciousness is often misconceived, ascribed properties it doesn�t have, and believed to underpin the mental in ways it does not:
extensiveness
consciousness is not the same as reactivity (to stimuli) � it�s narrower than that
consciousness is not continuous, nor does it encompass the �sum of our mental activity� (Titchener)
not a copy of experience
consciousness is not a store of sensory information
our memories are memories of what must-have-been, confabulated objectivised constructed, can be re-narratized � 1st person at will
much performance (e.g. piano, speech and tennis serves) are unconscious (�2nd nature�)
not necessary for concept
formation
no one has even been conscious of �a tree�
consciousness as unnecessary
in learning (some???) signals, skills + solutions
unnecessary in thinking
thinking is an automatic process following the struction
speech as resulting automatically from the structure (we are conscious of)
thinking is not part of consciousness � only its preparation, materials and end result are consciously perceived
consciousness is not
necessary for reasoning
it is necessary for logic (the science of post-rationalisation)
the 3 Bs of creative thought � bus, bed and bath
preparation, incubation, illumination
it�s setting up of complex struction with conscious attention paid to the materials of the struction, then the processing of reasoning/judgement has no representation in consciousness whatsoever
consciousness is
non-localised
This discussion is intended to support the idea of a man functioning identically without consciousness, to set the scene for the rest of the book.
Metaphor is far more than an �extra trick� of language. It is one of the most vital (in both senses of the word) aspects of language. It is by means of metaphor that we are able to relate new knowledge (metaphrand � the thing to be described, like multiplicand) to old knowledge (the metaphier � the the relation used to elucidate it, like multiplier), thereby understanding it. Thus, language is an organ of perception, not communication. He gives many examples, of body parts (head of an army, table, page, bed, shipo, household or nail), senses (thick-skinned, touchy, handle carefully, rub someone up the wrong way), bound in law (�ligare� � to bind with cord), law (�nomos� � foundations of a building), to be (Sanskrit �bhu� � to grow or make grow; and �asmi� � to breathe).
If we ever had a language that was infinitely expressive, we would have no more need of metaphor. The lexicon of language �is a finite set of terms that by metaphor is able to stretch out over an infinite set of circumstances, even to creating new circumstances thereby�. �(Could consciousness be such a new creation?)�.
He then discusses this conception of understanding is metaphor.
He develops the notion of metaphor further, by adding �paraphiers� and �paraphrands�. These are the connotations and associations that are attached in our mind with the metaphiers and metaphrands, that add depth to our metaphors. For instance, the snow covering the ground like a blanket can be fully appreciated when we realise that the snow is to the blanket what a bed is to the ground. The paraphiers, the assocations of bed, include warmth, snugness, lying flat etc.
He then describes the properties of consciousness as it appears to us, inside, first person. These include:
spatialisation
When we introspect, we appear to be navigating a mind-space, with ideas as occupying this space. Assocations are �close�, ideas are �big� etc. In the same way, time is mapped out along a left-right line etc.
excerption
We are not conscious of universals, only particulars, which come to represent the concepts they are examples of.
the analog �I�
This is the metaphor we have of ourselves, that navigates vicarially in our imagination
the metaphor �me�
Different from the analog �I� � perhaps an internally-generated 3rd person view of ourselves navigating through our imagination
narratisation
This is how we turn a succession of sensory information into events within a story
conciliation
Assimilation is the
process of stray facts being accommodated to fit in a scheme we generate around
ourselves xxx�
spatial narratisation? visualisation of ideas
This is where the thesis unfolds from the ideas in the first two chapters. As he says, unless you can grant that the conscious mind is not so instrumental in our lives as we sometimes like to think, then the following idea is wholly unconvincing.
Through a largely etymological study of the Iliad, Jaynes proposes that the Greeks were essentially non-conscious. The poem itself is largely composed of action, and where there is premeditated mentality of any sort, it is commanded by the gods. Thus, words like �thumos� and �psyche� take on their sense of mentality later; at the time of the Iliad, they concerned behaviouristic, physical processes. Though there are parts of the poem where internal discussion and deception is clearly demonstrated, these are likely to have been added later by poets, transcribers or recensionists, and it may even be possible to trace increased subjectivity over time as calculated by exegesis. The core of the poem consists of action, acts and consequences.
There is an acknowledgement among the heroes that the gods intervene on a personal level, as voices in their heads or as visions and forces in nature influencing events. These gods obey the laws of nature though, unlike the God of the Bible who can enforce his omnipotent will in any way he chooses. The �gods� of the Greeks have to act through the actions of the human protagonists. Thus, the bicameral mind divides into non-conscious man and instructive god.
One would expect a strict hierarchy (ultimately sanctioned by the gods???) to operate in such a society, despite the free individualist evidence of the Iliad. This can be understood with reference to the recently translated Linear B tablets, where details of a far stricter society are given. The Iliad can be seen as a compound of all the histories of all the bards who have contributed to its final state.
We can see the modern cases of this bicameral authority in schizophrenics, epileptics and the large proportion of the normal population who experience auditory and visual hallucinations. The nature of these voices varies enormously, from their character and tone, mood, position relative to the speaker, and the number of voices.
Why are hallucinated voices so powerful? In answer, Jaynes first points out the etymology of the word, �obey�, from the Latin (and in many other languages) �ob + audire� meaning to hear facing someone. To understand someone is to momentarily suspend one�s own identity in order to place oneself inside their head. To hear is actually a kind of obedience.
There are two properties of a voice we can alter to affect the extent a voice affects us:
the spatial distance
our opinion of the speaker
In the case of a hallucinated voice, the voice follows us everywhere, often drowns out conversations and even our own screaming; for the bicameral man, this voice was more powerful than a king or god, and its decrees were volition, that is to see that volition came in the form of a neurological command.
In this chapter, Jaynes hypothesises a neural substrate for bicamerality. It relies on the plasticity of the brain to explain how bicamerality could have broken down to form modern consciousness in the space of just a couple of thousand years. If this is the case, there should be neurophysiological and clinical evidence in modern man of a decayed man-god bicamerality. This is where the evidence about hallucinations comes in: if we can link hallucinations neurologically, then we can imagine how ancient Greek man�s bicameral brain was different.
Firstly, our brains are hemispherically divided, with language usually being located in the dominant left hemisphere, in Wernicke�s area in the temporal cortex. If we look at the corresponding area in the right hemisphere, it appears to be functionally inessential. Jaynes posits that the right hemisphere is vital in amalgamating admonitory experience, and exciting the area corresponding to Wernicke�s area occasioned the voices of the gods.
The evidence to support this can be brought together as 5 observations:
1. both hemispheres can understand language, although only the left can speak
2. there is some vestigial functioning of the right Wernicke�s area in a way similar to the gods
3. the two hemispheres can sometimes act almost as two separate persons, like the man-god bicamerality relationship
4. contemporary differences in cognitive function at least echo this difference
5. the brain is plastic enough to have undergone this change from bicamerality to consciousness as a result of learning and culture
He gives a reasonable level of evidence, mainly clinical and neurological to support these claims.
He goes on to discuss the origins of agricultural civilisation and language. How did early man, relying on more or less the same visual and auditory cues that higher primates employ today, manage to extend his social groups large enough for an agrarian society to emerge? A single male cannot realistically maintain direct control over all the community by domination and one-on-one confrontations, since primitive man was an animal � delegating a man to go and build a ford for an afternoon won�t work, because he�ll forget, he won�t be able to sustain long-term planning. This is what we need language for.
Jaynes contests that language was present in man 2 million years ago, pointing to the lack of archaelogical evidence for progression beyond crude tools further back than 40,000 years ago. Jaynes describes how language would evolve from intentional communication, the most basic form, where a signal gives rise to external behaviour, e.g. a threat signal leading to the group fleeing etc. Language progresses from calls, modifiers and commands, to nouns, and eventually to names. With names, things start to change, since individuals take on a more lasting character, and we start to see ceremonial burials emerging.
He discusses a very early Arabic(???) civilisation, called Eynan(???), as an example of emerging bicamerality. There, the leader of a 200-strong town takes on the role of god-king, and Jaynes speculates that just as we form an internal model of other people in our heads and can predict their behaviour, so the right hemispheres of the primitive people of Eynan started to follow orders that they speculate that the king would have given. Thus, people start appearing to behave in spontaneous, independent fashion by following the dictates of their right hemispheres which have taken on the character of their absent king. In this way, the ornate king�s burial can be explained, since they venerate him as a god and continue following his vicarious commands even after his death, until perhaps a new king takes over, whose voice gradually replaces the old king. In this way, temples and gods are born.
it�s quite an EMPIRICAL theory!! pg 61 top half
there is little about his theory that depends on modern results
some of the psychological experiments that inspired and support him are new, but the thoughts and introspections aren�t based on recent scientific/empirical discoveries. there�s no reason in principle why someone couldn�t have written his book 100 years ago.
how did the analogy of the flashlight and consciousness work???
find Bradley quote about metaphysics
do the 8 theories of consciousness he considers include: functionalism, dualism, 4 different forms of behaviourism
Michaelson-Morly ether experiment
aren�t exosomatic experiences confabulations???
does Jaynes really think conscious is wholly unnecessary???
am I convinced by his arguments for consciousness as unnecessary???
if I truly am an epiphenomenalist, then I must believe in zombies
how does metaphor create new circumstances?
analogy is a creative process
metaphor as the operator which we apply to the metaphrand/explanand???
is the real world both metaphor and metaphrand???
is para = connotations/associations of the metaphor-compound???what forms to do excerptions take??? more than visual/sensory (surely???)???
difference between excerption + memory (pg 62)???
the metaphor �me�, not as personality but as 3rd-person view of the analog �I� � where from???
analog vs model vs theory???
systematic relation between the neural and phenomological worlds, cf Chalmers???
he�s analysing the phenomenological character of consciousness from the 1st person
could we not study epileptics/schizophrenics to see what it might have been like for the Greeks???
why would Rolls et al dismiss Jaynes
his evidence is literary
where is the neural substrate change traceable through evolution that we would expect to underpin the breakdown of the bicameral phenomenological mind
implications for AI???
could we program in bicamerality as a precursor to an AI???
bicamerality breakdown � multiple drafts???
might the idea of voices in our head help imagine non-linguistic bicamerality???
or is it the other wayround, i.e. language � bicamerality
can we have non-conscious mental voices???
is there phenomenological experiential content, i.e. do they have qualia???
if not, what are they doing writing poetry???
why is Jaynes ignored???
where does language fit in with evolution??? what�s his mad theory???
hallucinations = bicamerality + qualia
is consciousness digital???
does this address the hard problem at all???
how does consciousness arise out of the breakdown of bicamerality???
why did consciousness evolve suddenly, worldwide???
Wernicke�s area most important
is bicamerality hard-wired???
are we neurologically different to bicameral men???
- not really
bicamerality vs internal mode
hallucinations <= stress (= decisoin-making, i.e. actions/choices)
what would it take to prove/disprove Jaynes???
that the brain is not plastic enough
that the right hemisphere Wernicke�s area does something else???
early tool/language use much further back
find a very different substrate for illusions
see his 5 observations